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1. “Deuxième” is French for “second.” To briefly summarize, Le Grand
Dérangement was a period in the 18th century when the British expelled the
Acadians from their homes in l’Acadie, present-day Nova Scotia. The British
claimed their property for the crown. The Acadians ended up in various places;
eventually, groups came to Louisiana. Many settled on the Louisiana coast and
swamplands, becoming the Cajuns. Some Cajun descendants and all private
landowners of coastal property potentially face losing their property to the State
as the Louisiana coast changes. See Katy Reckdahl, Mixing Oil and Water: An
Inside Look at What Happens When Land Sinks and Oil Money Is on the Line,
WEATHER CHANNEL, http://stories.weather.com/mixingoilandwater [https://perm
a.cc/45SH-LAPQ] (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).
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INTRODUCTION
Over 200 years ago, the Thibodeaux family settled in South Louisiana
where they lived, hunted, and fished on the Louisiana coast.2 Eventually,
the Thibodeauxs purchased a piece of land in close proximity to Vermilion
Bay.3 They paid—and continue to pay—property taxes on the coastal tract
of land, which the State required.4 In 2012, the Thibodeauxs authorized an
oil company to open an oil well on their property in exchange for
royalties.5 Right before the oil lease officially started, the State notified the
Thibodeauxs that 40 acres of their land, including the oil well, now
belonged to the State because the land submerged below navigable
2.
3.
4.
5.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 570

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

10/12/20 7:08 AM

2020]

COMMENT

1559

waters.6 Thus, the State took ownership of the land and the royalties from
the oil well without compensating the Thibodeauxs.7
For families like the Thibodeauxs, the State’s land grab is eerily
similar to the fate of their ancestors in the 18th century when the British
crown forcibly took the Acadians’ lands and exiled them from l’Acadie.8
The State’s actions seem to violate the fundamental right to own property
that the framers of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions expressly
protected.9 Thus, at face value, it seems Louisiana has abandoned one of
the fundamental purposes of government: preservation of citizens’
property.10 Instead, Louisiana is struggling to reconcile property
ownership with a changing coast.11
In Louisiana, private landowners own approximately 80% of coastal
land.12 Natural and human forces, however, are causing the land to
submerge beneath water bodies.13 In the Thibodeauxs’ case, the State
claimed that the land now sits below navigable water,14 thus reverting
ownership to the State under Louisiana Civil Code article 450.15 Article
450 defines State-owned property “as running waters, the waters and
bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the

6. Id. The author recognizes that the “Freeze Statute” allows an oil lease to
continue even after the State takes the land if the lease opened. See LA. REV STAT.
§ 9:1151. The scenario avoids the Freeze Statute because the lease was not
officially open. See id. Implications of the Freeze Statute are beyond the scope of
this Comment.
7. See Reckdahl, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”); see generally LA. CONST. art.
I, § 4(B).
10. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally LA. CONST. art. I, §
4(B).
11. See generally Christopher R. Handy, Filling the Lacuna with Water: HB
391 and Louisiana’s Problem with Public Access to Water, NEW ORLEANS BAR
ASS’N (July 6, 2018), http://www.neworleansbar.org/news/committees/fillingthe-lacuna-with-water-hb-391-and-louisiana-s-problem [https://perma.cc/8VAYJK72].
12. Gena Somra, Louisiana’s Shrinking Marshes Signal the Loss of a Way of
Life, CNN (June 6, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/06/us/
louisiana-land-loss-wxc/index.html [https://perma.cc/B84K-T3GD].
13. See generally Handy, supra note 11.
14. See Reckdahl, supra note 1.
15. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2018) (“Public things that belong to the state
are . . . the bottoms of natural navigable water bodies.”).

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 571

10/12/20 7:08 AM

1560

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

seashore.”16 Louisiana’s changing coast has caused once private land to
arguably be classifiable today as article 450 State-owned property.17 The
text and jurisprudential interpretation of article 450 suggest that the
submerged land should revert to the State by operation of law.18 Further,
coastal change has caused newly navigable water bodies to emerge on
private land, including a possible change of former non-navigable water
bodies into navigable water bodies.19 Article 450 and existing
jurisprudence do not provide concrete answers to the State or landowners
about ownership of newly navigable water bodies. Further, the
jurisprudence is unclear as to whether the State owes compensation if any
of the disputed property becomes State-owned land.20
Like the Thibodeauxs, similarly situated families live with a continual
fear that the State could reclassify—and assert ownership of—their land.21
Private landowners have combatted the State’s ownership claims by
maintaining their claims to the land.22 Further, neither the State nor private
landowners have taken formal action because both fear litigation expenses
and an unfavorable court ruling.23 Consequently, private landowners and
outdoorsmen have come into conflict because boaters cannot tell the
difference between State property that allows open access to the
waterways and private property that subjects boaters to potential trespass
liability.24 Private landowners have forcibly removed boaters, largely for
fear of tort liability if an injury were to occur on their land.25
This situation is ripe for judicial or legislative action because
Louisiana continues to lose land every hour along its coast.26 A proper

16. Id.
17. See generally Handy, supra note 11.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See generally Reckdahl, supra note 1.
22. Jacques Mestayer, Comment, Saving Sportsman’s Paradise: Article 450
and Declaring Ownership of Submerged Lands in Louisiana, 76 LA. L. REV. 889,
891 (2016). The Louisiana Office of State Lands has posted warnings about the
dual claim to ownership of the property. Id.
23. Id.
24. See generally Handy, supra note 11.
25. Id.; see, e.g., Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1989); State v. Barras, 602 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992); Buckskin
Hunting Club v. Bayard, 868 So. 2d 266 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004); Carpenter
v. Webre, 17-808, 2018 WL 1453201 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2018).
26. See generally Handy, supra note 11. Sources often equate the amount of
land loss per hour to a football field. See id.
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solution must consider takings law,27 which the State tried to avoid when
asserting a claim over the Thibodeauxs’ property.28 After analyzing the
issue under takings law, the State most likely owns land that submerges,
through entirely natural forces,29 beneath historically30 navigable water
bodies or the territorial sea because the State and the neighboring
landowner are parties to an aleatory contract,31 which causes the
submerged land to revert by operation of law.32 Because no taking occurs,
the State does not owe compensation to the landowner subject to the
aleatory contract.33 The aleatory contract, however, should not exist as to
newly34 created navigable water bodies because the landowner does not
lose his or her property right by operation of law.35 Thus, an impermissible
taking would occur if the State interfered with this land absent eminent
domain proceedings.36 Although the State does not have to compensate the
landowner whose land abuts historically navigable water bodies or the
territorial sea, the State can avoid this inequity if it passes an amendment
to the Louisiana Constitution allowing gratuitous compensation for this
27. Takings law derives from the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 4(B) of the Louisiana Constitution. Takings
law protects citizens from arbitrary governmental invasion of private property;
the government can only take private property for public purposes and after
paying just compensation. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B).
This Comment largely presupposes a situation where the Louisiana government
invades private land and the landowner seeks redress under Louisiana takings law.
28. See generally Reckdahl, supra note 1. Simply, the State does not owe
compensation if there is no taking. See discussion infra Part II.
29. But in Part IV, this Comment will point out that State action and private
action along the coast makes it very difficult for truly natural land loss. See
discussion infra Section IV.B.
30. “Historically” refers to water bodies that were navigable in 1812 or before
the State sold the land to private parties. See Vermilion Bay Land Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d 408, 411 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
31. “A contract is aleatory when, because of its nature or according to the
parties’ intent, the performance of either party’s obligation, or the extent of the
performance, depends on an uncertain event.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1912 (2018).
32. See discussion infra Section II.A. This Comment will refer to this
operation of law reversion as the “implied reversion.”
33. See discussion infra Section II.B.
34. “Newly” refers to water bodies made navigable after 1812 or after the
State sold the land to private parties. See generally Handy, supra note 11.
35. See discussion infra Section III.B.
36. See discussion infra Section III.B. Eminent domain is the “inherent power
of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. land, and convert
it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking.” Eminent
Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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land loss37 or extending Louisiana takings jurisprudence to include
inaction.38
Part I of this Comment explains Louisiana’s classification of things in
relation to water bottom ownership and Louisiana’s protection of private
property. Part II analyzes whether the State owes compensation if it takes
title to former private land that submerges beneath historically navigable
water bodies or the territorial sea. Further, Part II finds that an implied
reversion occurs where the State does not owe compensation if the land
submerges beneath historically navigable water bodies or the sea. Part III
argues that an implied reversion does not occur for newly formed
navigable water bodies because courts only look at historic navigability
for water bottom ownership. Part IV argues that the State could propose a
constitutional amendment calling for a gratuitous payment for the
landowners whose former lands submerge through natural forces beneath
historically navigable water bodies or the territorial sea. Further, Part IV
argues that the State should expand takings law to include inaction because
the State has a duty to protect the coast. This Comment concludes by
arguing that expanding takings to cover State inaction is the best solution.
I. LOUISIANA’S HISTORICAL CLASSIFICATION OF THINGS: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE WATER BOTTOMS
In the Louisiana Civil Code, the word “property” largely refers to
things and rights deriving from things, such as ownership.39 In Book II of
the Civil Code, a “thing” broadly refers to both objects that are susceptible
of ownership and objects insusceptible of ownership.40 In Louisiana
property law, the first major step in determining water bottom ownership
requires classifying whether the water body is navigable.41 To understand
the limits of State-owned submerged land, one must examine the limits of

37. See discussion infra Section IV.A. This Comment does not advocate for
the gratuitous compensation method because it would be almost impossible to
determine exactly what land the landowner lost and to have an amendment
adopted. It serves as illustration of a possible solution. This Comment takes the
view that expanding takings to cover inaction is the best option.
38. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
39. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE §
1:3, 1, 4 (5th ed. 2015). The word “property” largely comes from the French word
“propriété” but, other times, the French word meaning things: “biens.” Id.
40. Id. § 2:4, at 30–33.
41. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 450, 453 (2018).
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navigability and tidal influence.42 Moreover, human and natural forces—
erosion, subsidence, and sea-level rise43—have caused navigable waters
and the sea to expand, thus potentially expanding State property at the
expense of private property owners.44 Further, a court could classify the
water that has inundated private lands as navigable.45 The classification of
newly navigable water bodies has led to uncertainty because both the State
and private landowners claim ownership.46 Nevertheless, the State and
private landowners have refrained from using the courts to clear up
property titles because of the uncertainty surrounding the application of
Louisiana takings law.
A. Things Out of Commerce: Public Water Bottoms
Louisiana Civil Code article 448 states that things are “common,
public, and private; corporeals and incorporeals; and movables and
immovables.”47 The first division of things—common, public, and
private—determines whether a thing is susceptible of private ownership.48
In other words, the division determines whether a thing is in commerce or
out of commerce.49 According to article 449, common things, such as the

42. See id. art. 451 (“Seashore is the space of land over which the waters of
the sea spread in the highest tide during the winter season.”); see also Handy,
supra note 11. For navigable streams or rivers, the State owns the land up to the
ordinary low-water mark; however, the State owns the land up to the ordinary
high-water mark of navigable lakes. State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154, 172
(La. 1974) (reh’g).
43. Erosion is the “wearing away of something by action of elements; esp.,
the gradual eating away of soil by operation of wind, currents, or tides.” Erosion,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Subsidence is “[a]ny downward
movement of the soil from its natural position; esp., a sinking of soil.”
Subsidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
44. See Mestayer, supra note 22, at 892. This Comment largely deals with
natural forces, such as erosion, subsidence, or sea-level rise. See Miami Corp. v.
State, 173 So. 315, 322 (1936).
45. See Handy, supra note 11.
46. Id.
47. LA. CIV. CODE art. 448 (2018).
48. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 39, § 3:1, at 95–96.
49. Many modern civil codes use the phrases “in commerce” and “out of
commerce.” Id. Louisiana maintains the historical view: susceptibility or
insusceptibility of private ownership. Id.
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air and high seas, are insusceptible of ownership and out of commerce.50
Thus, nobody, including the State, can own common things.51
Similarly, public things are out of commerce and insusceptible of
private ownership.52 The Louisiana Civil Code defines public things as
things “owned by the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as
public persons.”53 According to paragraph 2 of article 450, “running
waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the
territorial sea, and the seashore” are public things that belong to the State.54
These things are out of commerce and always insusceptible of private
ownership as a matter of law for as long as one classifies them as such.55
Louisiana’s changing coast directly affects coastal land that could now fall
under the category of bottoms of navigable water bodies, seashore, or the
territorial sea.56 Thus, it is necessary to understand the bases of each
classification.
1. Natural Navigable Water Bodies57
The importance of navigability dates back to Louisiana’s statehood
and can be seen through the equal footing doctrine and the public trust
doctrine.58 Creating the equal footing doctrine, the United States Supreme
50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 449.
51. Id. This Comment is mainly concerned with the public and private
division because water bodies—rivers, streams, and lakes—are either public or
private depending on navigability. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450.
52. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 39, § 3:1, at 95–96.
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450.
54. Id.
55. New Orleans v. Carrolton Land Co., 60 So. 695, 696 (1913); see LA.
CONST. art. IX, § 3; LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. b; YIANNOPOULOS, supra note
39, § 3:8, at 105–08; JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF PROPERTY: A
PRÉCIS 13 (2012) (describing paragraph 2 of article 450 as “public things as a
matter of law”). Public things do not run the risk of acquisitive prescription
because they cannot be privately owned. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 cmt. b.
56. See generally Handy, supra note 11.
57. The term “natural” in article 450 refers to non-manmade water bodies.
See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 833 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, it
refers to water bodies made from nature and not manmade canals. Amigo
Enterprises v. Gonzales, 581 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991); but
see Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979) (inferring that if an artificial
canal displaces a natural waterway, then there may be a different result).
58. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 594 (La.
1975) (reh’g) (Summers, J., dissenting) (“When Louisiana was admitted into the
Union on April 8, 1812 ‘on an equal footing with the original states’, Louisiana
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Court determined that upon entering the Union, all states owned the
bottoms of navigable waterways,59 which put the new states on the same
level as the 13 original colonies.60 The public trust doctrine, on the other
hand, dictates that the states each hold navigable water bodies for the
benefit of their citizens, and states typically cannot alienate land in the
public trust.61
Addressing the public trust doctrine, the United States Supreme Court
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi determined that land subject to the
“ebb and flow” of the tide belonged to Mississippi in its public trust by
virtue of the equal footing doctrine, which also granted states ownership
of lands under tidal influence.62 The Court made clear that this land
belonged in the public trust and the State could not alienate it under state
law.63 The Supreme Court, however, pointed out a caveat: states can define
their public trusts.64 Louisiana, for instance, has a distinguishable public
trust from Mississippi.65 Louisiana defined its public trust to include the
“beds and bottoms of all navigable waters and the banks or shores of bays,
arms of the sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and navigable lakes.”66 Thus,
navigability is the key to Louisiana ownership of the bottoms of water
bodies in paragraph 2 of article 450, which are not territorial sea or
seashore.67

like all other states, acquired title, by virtue of its inherent sovereignty, to the beds
of navigable water bodies situated within its boundaries.”).
59. See, e.g., Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
60. See generally Handy, supra note 11.
61. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472–73 (1988).
Louisiana does not allow the alienation of public trust land. See LA. CONST. art.
IX, § 3 (“The legislature shall neither alienate nor authorize the alienation of the
bed of a navigable water body.”).
62. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 476.
63. Id. at 483–85.
64. Id. at 475 (“But it has been long established that the individual states have
the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize
private rights in such lands as they see fit.”).
65. See id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 41:1701 (2018).
66. LA. REV. STAT. § 41:1701:
The beds and bottoms of all navigable waters and the banks or shores of
bays, arms of the sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and navigable lakes belong to
the state of Louisiana, and the policy of this state is hereby declared to
be that these lands and water bottoms, hereinafter referred to as “public
lands,” shall be protected, administered, and conserved to best ensure
full public navigation, fishery, recreation, and other interests.
67. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 450, 451 (2018); LA. REV. STAT. § 41:1701.
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Navigability is a question of fact.68 A water body is navigable in fact
if one can use it as a highway of commerce in the customary mode of trade
and travel in the area.69 The Louisiana Office of State Lands published
unofficial guidelines to aid in determining navigability that suggest that
the water body should be at least 66 feet wide, connected to another
navigable water body, and feature water that flows through at least part of
the year.70
Although the Louisiana Office of State Lands defined navigability,
Louisiana courts have not applied the same standard.71 For example, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in 1906 determined that “grass choked” land,
which was only traversable by pirogues and small skiffs, was not
navigable.72 The Louisiana Supreme Court found that Bayou Castiglione
was not navigable because it had no historic commercial activity and that
navigability meant that the water body could “float a boat of some size,
engaged in carrying trade.”73 In contrast, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
1981 determined that Bogue Falaya River was navigable because it
historically supported a logging operation that floated logs down it.74 Here,
the Louisiana Supreme Court focused more on the capability for
commerce.75 The jurisprudence shows that the likelihood of navigability

68. Louisiana seems to have adopted the federal navigation definition. See
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (9 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870):
Those [water bodies] are public navigable [water bodies] in law which
are navigable in fact. [Water bodies] are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
69. See TRAHAN, supra note 55, at 13 (2012).
70. Guidelines for Determining State Water Bottoms, Office of State Lands,
https://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/assets/Resources/Publications/Oyster_Task_Forc
e/2013/oyster_task_force_2_28_13_guidelines_for_determining_state_water_bo
ttoms.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A83-QLBL] (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
71. Handy, supra note 11.
72. Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 41 So. 249, 251 (La. 1906).
73. Id.
74. Ramsey River Rd. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Reeves, 396 So. 2d 873, 876–
77 (La. 1981). The dissent viewed the mere capability of floating logs as
insufficient for classifying a stream as navigable. See id. at 877–78 (Dixon, C.J.,
dissenting).
75. Id. at 876–77 (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874))
(referring to “capability of use by the public for . . . transportation and commerce”).
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increases if the water body is deep, wide, and properly located for
commercial activities.76
In addressing these navigability factors for water bottom ownership,
courts often engage in a historical analysis.77 This analysis requires
Louisiana to determine navigability for ownership at two distinct times:
(1) 1812, the year Louisiana joined the Union;78 and (2) before the State
sold the land to a private party.79 The former derives from the equal footing
doctrine,80 and the latter came as an expansion from the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal in Vermilion Bay Land Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., which held that the State can reclassify its own property from private
to public.81 Although the State can reclassify its own property, the
jurisprudence remains unclear as to whether the State can use article 450
to reclassify private land as public if it submerges beneath newly navigable
water bodies created after 1812 or after the State sold the land to private
parties.82 The second paragraph of article 450 additionally lists the
territorial sea and seashore as inalienable things of the State.83
2. Territorial Sea and Its Shores
Although the territorial sea is navigable by nature, article 450 lists it
separately because tidal influence determines the extent of the territorial
sea. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 49:3 declares Louisiana’s ownership of
the territorial sea and seashore.84 According to article 451, the “[s]eashore

76. See State ex rel. Bd. Comm’rs of Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dist. v.
Capdeville, 83 So. 421, 425 (La. 1919) (A water body is navigable based on its
“depth, width, and location . . . for commerce . . . .”).
77. See, e.g., State v. Two O’Clock Bayou Land Co. 365 So. 2d 1174, 1177–
78 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1978); see generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd.,
317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1975) (reh’g).
78. Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 588–89.
79. Vermilion Bay Land Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d 408, 411
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.1994).
80. Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d at 588–89. The equal footing doctrine refers
to the land given to the State to put in the public trust upon entry into the Union.
Id.
81. Vermilion Bay Land Co., 646 So. 2d at 411.
82. See discussion infra Section III.B.
83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2018).
84. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:3 (2018):
The State of Louisiana owns in full and complete ownership the waters
of the Gulf of Mexico and of the arms of the Gulf and the beds and shores
of the Gulf and the arms of the Gulf, including all lands that are covered
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is the space of land over which the waters of the sea spread in the highest
tide during the winter season.”85 The equal footing doctrine gave
Louisiana ownership up to the highest tide mark of the sea in 1812.86
Article 451 makes clear that Louisiana owns land to the highest tide, no
matter the date.87 The Louisiana Legislature, however, expanded the
territorial sea inland.88 Commentators and legislators often use the term
“arms of the sea” for these expansions because they are extensions of the
sea.89
According to article 450, article 451, and jurisprudence, the State
owns the bottoms of the territorial sea, the bottoms of the arms of the sea,
and their shores up to the highest tide mark during the winter season.90
Although the territorial sea is not difficult to define, the arms of the sea are
not as easily defined.91 In Morgan v. Negodich, the Louisiana Supreme
Court determined that an arm of the sea should be in close proximity to
the coast and subject to direct tidal overflow.92 The Louisiana Supreme
Court in Buras v. Salinovich looked to Morgan and determined that the
land in question was not seashore because the water that overflowed the
land was not from an arm of the sea.93 The court examined the remoteness
of the plaintiff’s land from an arm of the sea, which was approximately
one mile in this case.94 The court found that the salt water of the sea did
not spread onto the plaintiff’s land directly, but that the tides caused bayou
water to rise and spread over the land.95 This indirect overflow did not
constitute an arm of the sea or seashore; thus the court properly classified
the land as private property.96
In 1962, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal more
expansively defined “arm of the sea” in D’Albora v. Garcia.97 In Garcia,
by the waters of the Gulf and its arms either at low tide or high tide,
within the boundaries of Louisiana.
85. LA. CIV. CODE art. 451.
86. See Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 826–27 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479–81 (1988)).
87. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 451.
88. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:3; see, e.g., Morgan v. Negodich, 3 So. 636, 639
(La. 1887).
89. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:3; Morgan, 3 So. at 639.
90. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 450, 451.
91. See generally Morgan, 3 So. 636.
92. Id. at 638–39.
93. Buras v. Salinovich, 97 So. 748, 750 (La. 1923).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. D’Albora v. Garcia, 144 So. 2d 911, 914 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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the court determined that a State-dug canal was an arm of the sea because
“the tides ebb[ed] and flow[ed] regularly.”98 More recently, in Davis Oil
Co. v. Citrus Land Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court returned to Morgan
and Buras to define arms of the sea.99 In Davis, a landowner and the State
fought over alluvion—an accumulation of earth on the bank of a river.100
Ultimately, the court found that the body of water in question was an arm
of the sea because it was in immediate proximity to the Gulf of Mexico
and the Gulf’s tides directly overflowed into it.101 Thus, the landowner had
no right to collect alluvion because the water body was an arm of the sea.102
Similar to bottoms of navigable water bodies, bottoms of the territorial
sea and arms of the sea are State-owned public things held in the public
trust for public use.103 The jurisprudence is likewise unclear as to whether
the landowner loses title to private property without compensation when
private land submerges beneath the territorial sea or its extensions because
of natural forces.104
B. Things in Commerce: Private Water Bottoms and the Protection of
Private Property
Contrary to common things and public things, private things are in
commerce and susceptible of private ownership.105 Louisiana Civil Code
article 453 defines private things as things “owned by individuals, other
private persons, and by the state or its political subdivisions in their
capacity as private persons.”106 Classifying a thing as private has
significant implications, such as attaching property rights.107 The owner of
a private thing has full authority over it if he acquired the thing without
any conditions or limitations.108
98. Id.
99. Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., 576 So. 2d 495, 500–01 (La. 1991).
100. Id. at 496. In Louisiana law, alluvion is the “accumulation of soil, clay,
or other material deposited on the bank of a river.” Alluvion, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
101. Davis Oil Co., 576 So. 2d at 501.
102. Id. Alluvion along the sea cannot belong to a private landowner, but
instead belongs to the State. See id. at 500; LA. CIV. CODE art. 500 (2018) (“There
is no right to alluvion or dereliction on the shore of the sea or lakes.”).
103. See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
104. See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
105. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 39, § 3:16, at 119.
106. LA. CIV. CODE art. 453.
107. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 39, § 3:16, at 119–20.
108. LA. CIV. CODE art. 477 (“Ownership is the right that confers on a person
direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing.”).
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Louisiana recognizes the Roman rights of usus, fructus, and abusus;
these three rights afford the owner full and complete ownership.109 Usus
gives the owner the right to use the thing—here, land—for anything
lawful,110 which includes the right to exclude others from entering upon
the land.111 The right to exclude is a fundamental property right that courts
go to great lengths to protect.112 The right of fructus gives the owner the
ability to enjoy the thing, such as royalties from an open oil well.113 Lastly,
abusus gives the owner the right to diminish the value of the land or
terminate ownership.114 Other than completely selling the land, the owner
has full authority to encumber the land by granting a servitude.115
Once a landowner acquires the bundle of rights—usus, fructus, and
abusus—the landowner holds the thing against the world and can exclude
all others.116 Although the State owns running water in its public capacity,
the public does not have a right to access non-navigable waters because
private owners can exclude public access.117 In fact, article 3413 states that
109. See TRAHAN, supra note 55, at 117; LA. CIV. CODE art. 477 (“The owner
of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it . . . .”).
110. TRAHAN, supra note 55, at 117; see LA. CIV. CODE art. 477.
111. Although article 450 states that running water is a public thing, this does
not create a public right of access or state navigational servitude; the private
landowner can restrict access to non-navigable water bodies or non-natural
navigable water bodies. See, e.g., Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052, 1060 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 834 (5th
Cir. 1993).
112. See, e.g., Brown, 552 So. 2d at 1060; Dardar, 985 F.2d at 834.
113. See TRAHAN, supra note 55, at 117. The Louisiana Civil Code defines
fruits as “things that are produced by or derived from another thing without
diminution of its substance.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 551. Natural fruits are “products
of the earth or of animals,” whereas civil fruits are “revenues derived from a thing
. . . such as rentals, interest, and certain corporate distributions.” Id. Often
compared to fruits are products, which are “derived from a thing as a result of
diminution of its substance.” Id. art. 488. In Crooks v. Department of Natural
Resources, the State extracted minerals from the landowner’s land without a valid
lease; the Louisiana Third Circuit ordered the State to reimburse the private
landowner’s lost royalties. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, reversed in
part because of prescription. See generally Crooks v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 263 So.
3d 540 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2019-0160, 2020
WL 499233 (La. Jan. 29, 2020) (reversing the lower court on the issue of
prescription).
114. See TRAHAN, supra note 55, at 117–18.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Dardar, 985 F.2d at 834. A landowner may use running water
that runs through his land; however, the landowner “cannot stop it or give it
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a landowner “may forbid entry to anyone for purposes of hunting or
fishing, and the like.”118 The law is unclear about whether private nonnavigable water bodies revert to State ownership if they become navigable
through natural causes.119 If the land does transfer to State control, the
private landowner would look to takings law to seek compensation for the
loss.120
C. Louisiana Takings Law
Federal jurisprudence has strongly influenced Louisiana’s takings
jurisprudence.121 Generally, a taking occurs when governmental action
results in the government acquiring a private landowner’s title to property
or when a regulation goes far enough to effectively amount to a taking.122
Traditionally, eminent domain is the government’s power to intentionally
engage in a taking, which is typically through a formal proceeding where
the government takes title to the property in exchange for compensation.123
Courts, however, historically recognized that a taking could occur without
expropriation proceedings, so courts allowed property owners to bring
inverse condemnation proceedings to allege governmental intrusions.124
The Founding Fathers expressly limited the government’s power of
eminent domain through the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, which
states that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”125 The purpose of the Takings Clause is to stop the federal
government “from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
another direction and is bound to return it to its ordinary channel where it leaves
his estate.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 658.
118. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3413.
119. See discussion infra Section III.B.
120. See discussion infra Section I.C.
121. See John J. Costonis, Avenal v. State: Takings and Damagings in
Louisiana, 65 LA. L. REV. 1015, 1023 n.29 (2005) (“It is not uncommon for
Louisiana courts addressing [Louisiana] takings or damagings issues to cite
federal authority.”).
122. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see
generally Costonis, supra note 121. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized partial regulatory takings. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Additionally, if a regulation takes all
economically viable use away from the land, then that can be a taking. See Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
123. See State v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. 1992).
124. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1113–14 (La. 2004).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
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which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”126 The Fourteenth Amendment makes this restriction operative
against the states, so states cannot make legislation that falls short of the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.127
Many states, including Louisiana, adopted a similar takings provision
in their respective state constitutions.128 Louisiana’s Takings Clause
provides that “[p]roperty shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its
political subdivision, except for public purposes and with just
compensation paid to the landowner.”129 In Louisiana, a taking occurs
when the State acquires the right of ownership or one of its recognized
dismemberments—usus, fructus, or abusus.130 The State damages
property when its actions diminish the value of the property.131 In the
context of coastal change, some academics believe that the State can avoid
takings liability when private land submerges beneath navigable water
bodies and the territorial sea because the State acquires ownership through
article 450 without its own action.132
II. THE IMPLIED REVERSION: SUBMERGED LAND ABUTTING
HISTORICALLY NAVIGABLE WATER BODIES OR THE TERRITORIAL SEA
As more land submerges and non-navigable water bodies become
navigable, property owners need to know when the State owes
compensation for its land acquisitions. An inverse condemnation analysis
is necessary for the landowner to know when the State owes a remedy and
so the State can adopt policies that respect private property rights while
adjusting to the changing coast.133 In Louisiana, a plaintiff in an inverse
condemnation analysis must prove three things: (1) the landowner had a
valid property right; (2) the State’s action constitutes a taking or damaging
126. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
128. See Costonis, supra note 121, at 1024.
129. LA. CONST. art I, § 4(B) (emphasis added).
130. See Costonis, supra note 121, at 1024.
131. Id. at 1025–28.
132. See generally Mestayer, supra note 22; see also Lee Hargrave,
“Statutory” and “Horatory” Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
43 LA. L. REV. 647, 661 (1983) (“[I]f a nonnavigable stream becomes navigable,
it would cease to be susceptible of private ownership and would become property
of the state. The argument that such a change in ownership may be a taking
without due process (absent compensation) probably falls because such a loss is
not caused by the state itself.” (footnote omitted)).
133. See generally State v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So. 2d 598 (La. 1992).
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of private property; and (3) the taking or damaging was for a public
purpose.134 After the analysis, Louisiana jurisprudence suggests that the
State does not owe compensation for land that naturally submerges under
historically navigable water bodies or the territorial sea because the private
landowner and the State are parties to an aleatory contract where the
landowner loses the valid property right if the land naturally submerges.135
A. Blending Private Law and Public Law with the Implied Reversion
An aleatory contract is a contract based on an uncertain event.136
Under aleatory contract theory, article 450 incorporates the concept that
the State and private landowner are parties to an implied contract, which
requires any land that naturally submerges beneath historically navigable
water bodies to revert to the State out of public necessity.137 For simplicity,
this Comment will refer to the above as the “implied reversion.”
The implied reversion mixes private law and public law.138 The
private elements—contract and property law—involve the private contract
between the State and landowner.139 The implied contract would vest the
property rights in the State through an operation of law the moment the
land naturally submerges.140 The loss of property rights triggers the takings
doctrine, which is in the public law sphere—constitutional law.141
Although private law and public law are discrete areas of law, they affect
134. Id. at 603. This Comment is mainly concerned with the first prong.
135. See discussion infra Section III.A.
136. “A contract is aleatory when, because of its nature or according to the
parties’ intent, the performance of either party’s obligation, or the extent of the
performance, depends on an uncertain event.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1912 (2018).
137. See generally Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936).
138. Private law is “[t]he body of law dealing with private persons and their
property and relationships.” Private law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). Public law is “[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between private
individuals and the government, and with the structure and operation of the
government itself; constitutional law.” Public law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
139. See Private law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
140. See Gaudet v. City of Kenner, 487 So. 2d 446, 448 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1986) (recognizing “instantaneous prescription” of land that submerges beneath
historically navigable water bodies through an “operation of law”). The author
warns against using the term “prescription” to describe the implied reversion
because a Louisiana court has held that the State cannot acquire land through
acquisitive prescription. See discussion infra Section III.B.3. “Prescription” is
more analogous when the State takes land beneath newly navigable water bodies.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
141. See Public law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
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each other because of the first prong of the Louisiana takings analysis:
whether a valid property right exists.142 Thus, under the implied reversion,
the private law contract takes away the ability to bring the public law
inverse condemnation claim because the landowner loses the property
right if the land naturally submerges—therefore not meeting the first prong
of the analysis.143
B. Tracing the Validity of the Implied Reversion of Naturally Navigable
Water Bodies
Article 450 is often the authority cited for the implied reversion.144
Article 450, however, does not contain an express provision about
transferring ownership; it only articulates that the State owns submerged
land, such as “natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and
seashore.”145 Articles 499 to 505, on the other hand, contain express
provisions about transferring ownership. For example, article 504 states:
“When a navigable river or stream abandons its bed and opens a new one,
the owners of the new land on which the new bed is located shall take . . .
the abandoned bed.”146 Article 504 grants the State ownership of the new
river bed but affords the previous landowner ownership over the old river
bed.147 Reading articles 450 and 504 in pari materia148 may lead to the
conclusion that article 450 does not transfer ownership because the
Louisiana Legislature knew how to place an express provision about
transferring ownership but intentionally omitted reference to a transfer in
ownership.149 The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has read an implied
transfer of ownership into article 450.150
142. See State v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So. 2d 598, 603 (La. 1992).
143. See discussion infra Section II.B.
144. See generally Mestayer, supra note 22.
145. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2018).
146. Id. art. 504:
When a navigable river or stream abandons its bed and opens a new one,
the owners of the land on which the new bed is located shall take by way
of indemnification the abandoned bed, each in proportion to the quantity
of land that he lost. If the river returns to the old bed, each shall take his
former land.
147. Id.
148. In pari materia is a civilian method of reasoning that dictates that laws
on the same subject matter should be interpreted in light of one another. ALAIN A.
LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE: SOURCES OF LAW AND METHODS OF
INTERPRETATION 94 (2015).
149. Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936) (O’Niell, C.J., dissenting).
150. See generally id.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 586

10/12/20 7:08 AM

2020]

COMMENT

1575

Originally, the implied reversion existed between the riparian151
landowner and the State over title to alluvion, as recognized in the
Louisiana Supreme Court case Succession of Delachaise v. Maginnis.152
Quoting the French scholar Portalis and his “Exposé des Motifs” of the
Code Napoléon, the court determined: “There exists, so to speak, an
aleatory contract between the riparious owner and nature, whose action
may at any moment despoil or increase his estate . . . like chance or
fortune.”153 Subsequent courts have inserted the State, as owner of the
adjacent water bottom, as the other party to the aleatory contract with the
landowner.154
In Miami Corp. v. State, the Louisiana Supreme Court used the
reasoning from Maginnis to find an implied reversion for land abutting
historically navigable rivers or lakes.155 In Miami Corp., the landowner
fought the State over a piece of submerged land below a navigable lake,
which was navigable in 1812.156 At the time of Miami Corp., the Louisiana
Civil Code article on public things—present-day article 450—omitted
lakes, but the Louisiana Supreme Court nevertheless implied that the
article included lakes.157 The majority opinion relied only on the article on
public things to justify the State’s taking of ownership of the land from the
landowner without compensation.158 The court found that “where the
forces of nature—subsidence and erosion—have operated on the banks of
a navigable body of water . . . the submerged area becomes a portion of
the bed and is insusceptible of private ownership.”159 In the implied
reversion, the State, through its inherent sovereignty, acquires ownership
of any land that submerges beneath historically navigable water bodies.160
Thus, the reasoning of the majority in Miami Corp. incorporated the
151. Riparian, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Of, relating to,
or located on the bank of a river or stream (or occasionally another body of water,
such as a lake.”).
152. Succession of Delachaise v. Maginnis, 11 So. 715, 716 (La. 1892).
153. Id.
154. See Miami Corp., 173 So. at 318 (“The articles quoted in reality make the
riparian owner a party to an aleatory contract, in which the State as the owner of
the bed of the stream is the other party.”).
155. See generally id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 318–19 (French courts included lakes in their interpretation of
public things.).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 322.
160. Id. at 322–23. This result seems necessary to protect land currently in the
public trust because it would be absurd for landowners to restrict access to an
entire lake if private ownership persisted along the rim. Id. at 323.
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implied reversion into the titles of landowners whose lands abut
historically navigable rivers and lakes.161
In Miami Corp., the plaintiff did not receive compensation for the lost
land.162 The private landowner loses the land once natural forces cause the
land to submerge beneath navigable water because, through the implied
reversion, the State gains title as a result of its sovereignty.163 Similarly,
landowners in the future whose lands abut historically navigable water
bodies will not receive compensation if land submerges because the
property owners will lose their valid property rights.164 Thus, the inverse
condemnation claim would fail because the property owner could not
satisfy the first prong of the analysis and show a valid property right.165
Reading the relevant concepts contained in article 450—natural
navigable water bodies and territorial sea—in pari materia166 and applying
a pari ratione,167 the result should be the same for the landowner of land
that abuts navigable water bodies and of land that abuts the shores of the
territorial sea because laws on similar subject matters should reach similar
results.168 The seashore, however, was a common thing under the Civil
Code at the time of Miami Corp. and remained one until the 1978 code
revision.169 In addition, the jurisprudential history has not always found
the same result for the sea bottom.170
C. The Implied Reversion Encompasses the Territorial Sea and the Arms
of the Sea
Prior to the Constitution of 1921, Louisiana did not have an expressed
constitutional prohibition on granting patents to bottoms of navigable
water bodies, including the sea.171 In California Co. v. Price, despite the
reasoning of Miami Corp., the Louisiana Supreme Court found these
161. Id. at 327 (“[T]he rights of the sovereign State to ownership of the beds
of navigable waters must be read into the titles of those who own land bordering
on such waters.”).
162. Id.
163. See generally id.
164. See generally id.
165. See generally id.
166. In pari materia is a civilian method of reasoning that dictates that laws
on the same subject matter should be interpreted in light of one another.
LEVASSEUR, supra note 148, at 94.
167. A pari ratione is reasoning by analogy. Id at 105.
168. Id. at 94.
169. LA. CIV. CODE art. 449 cmt. c (2018).
170. See generally California Co. v. Price, 99 So. 2d 743 (La. 1957).
171. See Mestayer, supra note 22, at 912.
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private patents to the bottoms valid because the State authorized the
patents before a constitutional prohibition.172 In 1975, Gulf Oil Corp. v.
State Mineral Board overturned California Co. because of “erroneous
reasoning” and clarified that private ownership of sea bottoms and
navigable water bodies is not allowed because they are inalienable things
of the State.173 The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that beds of
navigable water bodies and the territorial sea are always insusceptible of
private ownership and belong to the State through its inherent
sovereignty.174 Thus, as the law currently stands, private individuals
cannot own sea bottoms, including the shores and arms of the sea.175
Gulf Oil Corp. implied that the reasoning of Miami Corp. should
extend to all public things in paragraph 2 of article 450.176 The Louisiana
Supreme Court, therefore, confirmed that private lands abutting navigable
water bodies and the territorial sea are subject to the same implied
reversion, which courts will read into all private landowners’ titles.177 An
inverse condemnation claim would similarly fail because the private
landowner does not have a valid property right once the land submerges
beneath an article 450 public thing.178 Thus, under Louisiana law, the
landowner whose land abuts a navigable water body or the shores of the
territorial sea loses any naturally submerged land to the State without
compensation because the State, as sovereign, acquires the property right
through the implied reversion.179 As the law currently stands, the
landowner must bear this unfortunate burden.
D. Alternate Theory to the Implied Reversion: The Landowner’s Theory
Given the harshness of the situation for private land abutting
historically navigable water bodies or the territorial sea, the landowner
172. California Co., 99 So. 2d 743.
173. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State, 317 So. 2d 576, 581 (La. 1975) (reh’g).
174. Id.
175. See id.; but see Mestayer, supra note 22, at 912 (describing how some
patents before 1921 might be valid).
176. See generally Gulf Oil Corp., 317 So. 2d 576.
177. See generally id.; Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315, 318 (La. 1936). The
French scholar Portalis originally stated that the implied reversion concerned the
private property owner and nature, but the courts have inserted the State for
nature. Compare Succession of Delachaise v. Maginnis, 11 So. 715, 716 (La.
1892) (describing relationship as with nature), with Miami Corp., 173 So. at 318
(defining relationship as with the State).
178. See generally Miami Corp., 173 So. 315; Gaudet v. City of Kenner, 487
So. 2d 446, 448 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
179. See generally Miami Corp., 173 So. 315; Gaudet, 487 So. 2d at 448.
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must either accept the situation or try to limit the application of the implied
reversion. An alternate theory to the implied reversion is that the naturally
submerging land does not vest to State control until after the State brings
an eminent domain proceeding to assert ownership and pay
compensation.180 In the “landowner theory,” the property owner maintains
the valid property right until after the State invokes the implied reversion
in a court proceeding.181 Ultimately, under the landowner theory, the
private property owner would survive the first prong and then argue that
the government’s action—implied reversion—constitutes a taking for a
public purpose.182 Although no appellate opinions address the landowner
theory, it would prove unworkable because it would require a change in
the ratio decidendi183 of Miami Corp. and article 450.184
It is unlikely that a Louisiana court would depart from the reasoning
in Miami Corp. because the majority in Miami Corp. based its decision on
sound reasoning and public necessity.185 The court recognized that private
landowners could absurdly restrict public access to a navigable lake if
allowed to keep ownership of eroded land around the entire rim.186 The
reason for the implied reversion is to protect public access to navigable
water bodies and the territorial sea and to protect commerce.187
Secondly, the trigger for the performance of an obligation in an
aleatory contract is the uncertain event, not a court proceeding.188 In this
context, the uncertain event is the land naturally submerging, which
180. The evidence of the landowner theory lies in landowners’ arguments that
the State violates their rights when asserting ownership. See generally
Reckdahl, supra note 1.
181. See generally id.
182. See generally id. The author does not advocate for the landowner theory
as anything but a last-ditch effort to protect property rights. The landowner
theory’s reasoning, however, is more applicable to newly created navigable water
bodies. See discussion infra Section III.B.
183. Ratio decidendi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (meaning
“reason for deciding”).
184. See Gaudet, 487 So. 2d at 448 (recognizing “instantaneous prescription”
of land that submerges beneath historically navigable water bodies through an
“operation of law”).
185. Id.
186. Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315, 323 (La. 1936) (stating the absurd
result if landowners could restrict access to an entire lake).
187. Id.
188. “A contract is aleatory when, because of its nature or according to the
parties’ intent, the performance of either party’s obligation, or the extent of the
performance, depends on an uncertain event.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1912 (2018)
(emphasis added).
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triggers the implied reversion.189 Thus, since the relationship between the
landowner and the State is that of an aleatory contract, only the
submerging of land will trigger the obligation.
Lastly, even if the landowner proves a valid property right, it is
unlikely that a court would find a taking.190 Under contract and property
principles, the enforcement of the implied reversion is an exercise of a preexisting right in property.191 Courts would not have to look long to find a
comparable burden to compare the aleatory contract against: the levee
servitude burdens many landowners abutting navigable water bodies.192
The levee servitude dates back to colonial times.193 France and Spain
required riparian landowners to build and maintain levees at their own
expense, on threat of forfeiture of property.194 This practice remained
intact until the State took over the burden in 1878.195 Even with the State
taking control of the levee systems, the levee servitude continues to burden
private land; thus, the State can appropriate the land when necessary for
levee purposes.196 Unfortunately for the landowner, in Eldride v.
Trezevant, the United States Supreme Court determined that the State does
not owe compensation for the levee appropriation because the State is only
exercising a pre-existing right.197 Thus, according to the Court,

189. See generally Miami Corp., 173 So. 315. The immediate transfer of title
gives the appearance of “instantaneous prescription.” See Gaudet, 487 So. 2d at
448.
190. See S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 308 (La. 2017).
191. Cf. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 465–66 (1896) (recognizing an
existing right in levee servitude).
192. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 42. The levee servitude is found in the Civil
Code as well. LA. CIV. CODE art. 665 (2018):
Servitudes imposed for the public or common utility relate to the space
which is to be left for the public use by the adjacent proprietors on the
shores of navigable rivers and for the making and repairing of levees,
roads, and other public or common works. Such servitudes also exist on
property necessary for the building of levees and other water control
structures on the alignment approved by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers as provided by law, including the repairing of hurricane
protection levees. All that relates to this kind of servitude is determined
by laws or particular regulations.
193. See Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 308.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 308–09.
196. See generally id.
197. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 465–66 (1896) (stating how the
landowner never acquires full dominion).
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appropriating land burdened with the levee servitude does not equate to a
taking.198
Like the levee servitude, the implied reversion is an exercise of a preexisting right.199 Although exercising a servitude right and acquiring
ownership over property are different, both are read into titles of
landowners whose lands abut navigable water bodies out of public
necessity.200 Thus, it is likely that the State’s action—exercising the
implied reversion—does not constitute an unlawful taking in the
constitutional sense.201
Instead of attacking the implied reversion or its application, a better
approach for the private landowner is to fight to expand takings liability
and limit the implied reversion to private land abutting historically
navigable water bodies or the territorial sea.202 The law is relatively clear
in regard to private lands abutting historically navigable water bodies or
the territorial sea: the State acquires the property without owing
compensation because of the implied reversion in article 450.203 There is,
however, a gap in the law about whether newly formed navigable water
bodies on private property, including non-navigable water bodies
becoming navigable, are subject to the same implied reversion.204
III. TAKINGS OR NOT: SUBMERGED LAND AND NEWLY NAVIGABLE
WATER BODIES
Although the State does not owe compensation if land naturally
submerges beneath historically navigable water bodies or the territorial
sea because of the implied reversion, the legislation and jurisprudence do
not answer whether the implied reversion extends to newly formed
navigable water bodies—navigable water bodies created after 1812 or
after the State sold the land to private parties.205 Thus, reason and policy
198. See id.; Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 308 (stating landowner never acquired
complete ownership over the land).
199. Cf. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 308 (treating levee servitude as pre-existing
right).
200. Id.
201. The State cannot take its own property. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085,
1106 (La. 2004). The implied reversion returns the property to the State, so the
landowner loses the property right to assert an inverse condemnation claim. See
id.
202. See discussion infra Section III.B; see discussion infra Section IV.B.
203. See generally Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936).
204. See Handy, supra note 11.
205. Id.
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must guide the solution.206 In his 2016 student Comment, Jacques
Mestayer argued that the State acquired newly navigable water bodies
without owing compensation, just like historically navigable water
bodies.207 After a similar inverse condemnation analysis, the State owes
compensation if it asserts ownership over newly created navigable water
bodies on private property, including a non-navigable water body
becoming navigable, because courts as a matter of reason and policy look
to historic navigability for property ownership.208 Further, the implied
reversion should not apply to the newly created water bottoms because the
reasons for the implied reversion do not exist for newly navigable water
bodies. A change in the law would produce inequitable results.209
A. Argument to Expand the Implied Reversion
In his Comment, Mestayer argued that the test for water bottom
ownership should add a third point in time to examine navigability: the
present state of the water body.210 Thus, Mestayer articulated that present
navigability could alter land ownership.211 Although Mestayer never
directly called it an expansion of the implied reversion, his proposal would
result in just that.212 Mestayer recognized that there was no legislation nor
jurisprudence on point, so he relied on reason, logic, and policy.213 First,
Mestayer determined that a literal reading of article 450 buttresses the
reasoning that the land reverts to the State.214 Mestayer stated that article
450 refers to bottoms of natural navigable water bodies and the territorial
sea as public things without distinguishing if or when the land
submerged.215 He used the maxim “when the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish” to support a reading of the article that all
bottoms of naturally navigable water bodies and territorial sea are public
206. “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation
or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably,
resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usage.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 4
(2018).
207. See generally Mestayer, supra note 22.
208. See discussion infra Section III.B.
209. See discussion infra Section III.B.
210. Mestayer, supra note 22, at 909.
211. See generally id.
212. Ultimately, Mestayer proposed a statute codifying and expanding the
implied reversion, which technically sought to turn the implied reversion into the
“expressed reversion.” See id. at 918–19.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 909; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2018).
215. Mestayer, supra note 22, at 896.
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things, no matter when they submerged.216 Second, Mestayer reasoned,
citing the Louisiana Constitution, that the policy of the State is to prevent
private ownership of navigable water bottoms.217 Finally, Mestayer argued
that allowing private ownership of bottoms of newly navigable water
bodies would disrupt commerce because private landowners could exclude
the public from accessing the water bodies for trade and recreation.218
In reaching his conclusions about historically navigable water bodies,
the territorial sea, and newly navigable water bodies, Mestayer asserted
that the State acquired the land without having to compensate the
landowner because the State was not the cause of the land submersion and
the change happened by an operation of law.219 Mestayer’s position rested
on the private property owner losing the property right, similar to the
landowner whose land abuts historically navigable water bodies or the
territorial sea.220 Conversely, a noted commentator, A.N. Yiannopoulos,
suggested that a private landowner has a strong argument that an unlawful
taking occurs if the State takes title to newly navigable water bodies
without compensation.221
B. The Landowner of a Newly Navigable Water Body Maintains the
Property Right until Expropriation
Mestayer’s proposal paints an alarming picture for private property
owners: when it comes to coastal change, private property rights are in
danger.222 Despite the reasoning of Mestayer, the bottoms of the newly
navigable water bottoms must remain private until an expropriation
proceeding because courts determine ownership of water bottoms at two
distinct times as matter of sound reason and policy.
The application of navigability “must be predicated upon careful
appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of ‘navigability’ was
invoked in a particular case.”223 The concept of navigability for, say,
maritime tort jurisdiction may differ from property ownership.224 In
216. Id. at 909–11.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 909–12.
219. Id. at 916.
220. Id.
221. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 39, § 4:2, at 130; see Vermilion Bay Land
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d 408, 412 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994)
(citing Yiannopoulos for this proposition).
222. See generally discussion supra Section III.A.
223. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171 (1979).
224. See id. at 170–72.
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Louisiana law, although navigability is a question of fact and a water body
may presently be navigable, courts determine ownership of the bottoms of
the newly navigable water bodies on private property as a matter of law at
two distinct times: (1) in 1812; and (2) before the State sold the land to
private parties.225
In State v. Two O’Clock Bayou Co., the Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal pointed out that a bayou was navigable in fact because of its
present physical characteristics: depth, width, and location for
commerce.226 The court noted that this determination did not affect
property ownership.227 The court reiterated that the important date for
ownership of the bayou’s bottoms was still 1812.228
In Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, interpreting Louisiana law, determined that the district
court was correct to ignore the subsequent navigability of a waterway and
that the district court correctly focused on 1812 as the determinative date
for water bottom ownership.229 The Fifth Circuit cited the Louisiana
Supreme Court case Ramsey River Road Property Owners Association v.
Reeves for support.230 Ramsey River dictated that 1812 was the
determinative date for ownership over the water body at issue.231
Recently, in 2018, in Crooks v. Department of Natural Resources, the
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal determined that Catahoula Lake
was not a navigable lake because the “lake” was actually flooding from a
navigable river.232 Despite the area’s public status as a lake and a previous
court accepting a stipulation that the area was a navigable lake, the court
focused on the status of the water body in 1812 for bed ownership.233 In
finding the land in question as only overflow from a nearby river in 1812,
the submerged land beneath the water was private property because article

225. State v. Two O’Clock Bayou Co., 365 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1978); Vermilion Bay Land Co., 646 So. 2d at 411.
226. Two O’Clock Bayou Co., 365 So. 2d at 1177.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 833 (5th Cir. 1993).
230. Id. at 831; see Ramsey River Rd. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Reeves, 396 So.
2d 873, 876–77 (La. 1981).
231. Ramsey River, 396 So. 2d at 876–77.
232. Crooks v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 263 So. 3d 540, 556–57 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2019-0160, 2020 WL 499233 (La. Jan. 29,
2020) (reversing the lower court on the issue of prescription).
233. Id.
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450 and the equal footing doctrine did not take it away.234 Although the
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower court over prescription
issues, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s findings
as to the status of the water body.235
Looking at the present navigability to alter bed ownership violates the
purpose of the equal footing doctrine, which is to grant states ownership
to the bottoms of navigable water bodies at the time they entered the
Union.236 Three sound reasons exist for why the two distinct times to test
for water bottom ownership must remain the law: (1) a change in
navigability should not be used to alter ownership because of reasonable
expectations; (2) there is no implied reversion; and (3) equity principles
favor this method.
1. Change in Navigability Should Not Be Used to Alter Ownership
The United States Supreme Court has hinted that using the concept of
navigability to change ownership without compensation runs afoul of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.237 In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the
federal government tried to use the definition of navigability to change
private property rights.238 In Kaiser Aetna, an island separated a pond,
known as Kuapa Pond, from the Pacific Ocean and Maunalua Bay.239
Hawaiian law dictated that this pond was private property.240 Through
private funds, but with the approval of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, the owners developed a marina.241 The petitioners dredged and
filled Kuapa Pond, connecting it to the Bay.242 The petitioners’
development increased the depth of the pond, which resulted in

234. Id. Likely, the court would have reached the same result even if the State
did not contribute to the flooding through a project because the court looked to
1812 without regard to the change the project caused. See id.
235. See Crooks v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2019-0160, 2020 WL 499233 (La. Jan.
29, 2020).
236. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 594 (La. 1975)
(reh’g) (“Louisiana like all other states, acquired title, by virtue of its inherent
sovereignty, to the beds of navigable water bodies situated within its
boundaries.”).
237. See generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
238. See generally id.
239. Id. at 166.
240. Id. at 179.
241. Id. at 179.
242. Id. at 180.
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navigability.243 The United States government brought a suit that
challenged the ability of the private owners to exclude people from the
waters.244 The government argued that the pond was now in the regulatory
power of the United States and a navigational servitude existed, so the
public should have free access.245 The Court found the water navigable but
held that such finding did not lead to an automatic right of public access.246
In its holding, the Court stated that navigational servitudes do not “create[]
a blanket exception to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority to promote
navigation.”247 Thus, the Court determined that the government could
regulate the property, but the government must pay compensation to the
private owners.248
Louisiana courts have followed a similar reasoning to Kaiser Aetna.249
In Brown v. Rougon, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal rejected
the idea that a person had the right to access a navigable canal built with
public funds because the canal stayed private property.250 Over time, the
Rougons prevented people from accessing the canal for transportation or
fishing without their permission.251 The Browns fought for a public right
of access because the canal was arguably navigable.252 The First Circuit
held that forcing the Rougons to allow for public access would be a taking
without compensation regardless of where the funds came from or whether
the canal was navigable.253
Kaiser Aetna and Brown broadly illustrate that the state or federal
government should not be able to take property or a right in the property
without compensation just because a once non-navigable water body
becomes navigable.254 Although Kaiser Aetna and Brown involved
artificially created water bodies, Louisiana courts should extend this logic
243. Id. at 167 (increasing depth from two to six feet and dredging an eightfoot channel to connect the pond to the Pacific Ocean).
244. Id. at 169.
245. Id. at 169–70.
246. Id. at 170–72.
247. Id. at 172.
248. See generally id.
249. See, e.g., Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
250. Id. at 1059–61.
251. Id. at 1055.
252. The Sheriff’s office arrested the Browns for refusing to leave the canal
upon request. Id.
253. Id. at 1059–61.
254. See generally id.; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)
(describing how navigation places the water in the regulatory power of Congress
but does not per se create a public right of access).
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to newly naturally forming water bodies because private landowners have
a reasonable expectation to keep their land, on which they have paid taxes
for generations, similar to the landowners in Kaiser Aetna and Brown.255
Worded differently, the landowners never reasonably expected to lose
ownership of their land from a change in navigability, whether natural or
artificial, because their lands were not abutting a historically navigable
water body.
Addressing Kaiser Aetna, a major factor in the decision was that the
pond was always private and the public never had access, but the
landowners always had the fundamental right to exclude others.256 The
United States Supreme Court determined that the landowners in Kaiser
Aetna had a reasonable expectation in the land.257 The situation is similar
to Louisiana where land becomes submerged under newly navigable water
bodies because the land has long been private with no public access and
landowners have long paid property taxes on the land. In Louisiana,
declaring the land public will result in more than a physical invasion like
in Kaiser Aetna—it will result in a complete loss in title.258
Although Kaiser Aetna suggests that a change from a non-navigable
water body to navigable should not alter ownership until after the State
pays compensation, a narrow reading of Kaiser Aetna would restrict its
application to the navigational servitude and artificially created navigable
water bodies. The federal navigational servitude still might appear in
situations where the public interests outweigh the private interests.259
Louisiana does not have a navigational servitude because running water,
although a public thing, does not create a right of public access to private
water bodies.260 At the 2018 House Regular Session, Louisiana legislators
255. The United States Supreme Court has “recognized the importance of
honoring reasonable expectations in property interests.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1988) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
256. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179–80 (stating that the right to exclude is
such a fundamental right that the government cannot take it without
compensation).
257. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 482 (citing Kaiser Aetna as adhering
to reasonable expectations).
258. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179–80 (describing government as going
beyond mere regulation and committing a physical invasion by taking away the
right to exclude).
259. Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 834 (5th Cir. 1993).
260. Id. Louisiana courts have rejected the proposition that running water,
being a public thing, creates a public right to access private non-navigable water
bodies. See, e.g., Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052, 1060 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1989).
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proposed House Bill 391 to create a navigational servitude and ensure that
“[n]o person may restrict or prohibit, pursuant to the authority of Civil
Code Article 3413 or otherwise, the public navigation of running
waters . . . .”261 Ultimately, the bill failed because it lacked support, and
people feared expanded takings liability from the reasoning in Kaiser
Aetna and Brown.262 Since a navigational servitude was not at issue,
Kaiser Aetna arguably might be inapplicable to newly formed navigable
water bodies. Even with a narrow interpretation, if the State cannot acquire
a servitude right or public access without compensation, then, a fortiori,263
the State should not be able to acquire complete ownership—usus, fructus,
and abusus—of the submerged land without compensation or the implied
reversion.
2. No Implied Reversion
The implied reversion that exists with historically navigable water
bodies and the territorial sea does not extend to newly formed navigable
water bodies because the purpose for extending the implied reversion
differs from the purpose propounded in Miami Corp.: to protect existing
public access.264 The reasoning in Miami Corp., however, is not applicable
to newly created navigable water bodies because the public never had a
right to access the land or prior non-navigable water bodies.265 The private
landowner always had the right to exclude the public from this disputed
land and paid taxes on the land.266 Thus, private landowners would not
disrupt commerce because public commerce never existed in this area
before.267 Simply, the implied reversion is a shield to protect existing
public access, not a sword to expand State-owned land at the expense of
private property owners. The court did not intend to extend the Miami
Corp. purpose to include expanding public access to areas that the public
could never access.268 Accordingly, newly navigable water bodies do not
revert to the State through an implied reversion because the purpose of the
261. See generally H.B. 391, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018); see also LA.
CIV. CODE art. 450 (2018) (“Public things that belong to the state are such as
running waters . . . .”).
262. See generally Handy, supra note 11.
263. A fortiori means “[b]y even greater force or logic.” LEVASSEUR, supra
note 148, at 111.
264. See generally Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936).
265. See generally id.
266. See generally id.
267. See generally id.
268. See generally id.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 599

10/12/20 7:08 AM

1588

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

implied reversion is to protect existing public access and commerce, not
to expand public access to places where the public never before had
access.269 Expanding the scope of navigability for ownership would violate
the spirit of its purpose and basic equity.
3. Inequities of “Instantaneous Prescription”270
When enacting article 450, Louisiana legislators left interpreting the
definition of navigability to the courts.271 So far, Louisiana courts have
only identified two points in time to test for navigability for water bottom
ownership: 1812272 and before selling the land to a private party.273
Adopting a third point in time, as Mestayer suggested, would unfairly take
property away from landowners who had valid titles without
compensation. The design of article 450 was to protect land in the public
trust, not to expand the land in the public trust at the cost to private
landowners.274
The implied reversion removes the unfairness that comes with a
sudden change in ownership by placing the landowner on prior notice of
the State’s existing rights in submerged lands under historically navigable
water bodies.275 Because the implied reversion should not extend to newly
navigable water bodies, the owner is not on notice that land abutting or
under newly navigable water bodies is susceptible to a sudden change in
ownership.276 Without the implied reversion, the State is simply taking
submerged land through “instantaneous prescription” because the State
asserts to transfer land from a landowner with a valid title to itself—
analogous to acquisitive prescription.277 A Louisiana court, however, has
269. See generally id.
270. See Gaudet v. City of Kenner, 487 So. 2d 446, 448 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1986) (recognizing “instantaneous prescription” of land that submerges beneath
navigable water bodies through an “operation of law”).
271. There is no definition of “navigable” in the Civil Code. See generally LA.
CIV. CODE art. 450 (2018).
272. Handy, supra note 11.
273. Id.
274. See generally Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936).
275. See discussion supra Part II.
276. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
277. Instantaneous prescription is not a codified concept like acquisitive
prescription. Instead, the term is descriptive of the sudden change in ownership of
submerged land and how it appears like a form of acquisitive prescription without
any delay period. See Gaudet v. City of Kenner, 487 So. 2d 446, 448 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 1986) (using term “instantaneous prescription,” describing implied
reversion appearance). The author uses the term to illustrate how allowing the
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held that the State acquiring property through prescription is an
unconstitutional taking.278
In Crooks v. Department of Natural Resources, the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal found that the State cannot acquire property
through acquisitive prescription because it would be a taking without
compensation.279 Reasoning a fortiori,280 allowing the concept of
instantaneous prescription of submerged land would be a taking because
it is merely a heightened version of acquisitive prescription—
instantaneous prescription transfers title without a possessory delay
period.281 Although it is debatable whether the State can benefit from
acquisitive prescription,282 the concept of instantaneous prescription has
the element of surprise and unfairness that takings law should protect
against because the State would instantly acquire ownership of private
instantaneous transfer of submerged lands is likely an unconstitutional taking
without the implied reversion. “Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring
ownership or other real rights by possession for a period of time.” LA. CIV. CODE
art. 3446 (2018). The delay period for acquisitive prescription of an immovable
without just title or good faith is 30 years of possession. See id. art. 3486; id. art.
462 (“Tracts of land, with their component parts, are immovables.”).
278. Crooks v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 263 So. 3d 540, 556 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2019-0160, 2020 WL 499233 (La. Jan. 29,
2020) (reversing the lower court on issue unrelated to acquisitive prescription).
279. Id.
280. A fortiori means “[b]y even greater force or logic.” LEVASSEUR, supra
note 148, at 111.
281. Compare Crooks, 263 So. 3d 540 (determining that the State commits a
taking using acquisitive prescription), with Gaudet, 487 So. 2d at 448 (analogizing
implied reversion to instantaneous prescription), and Vermilion Bay Land Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d 408, 412 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994) (citing
Yiannopoulos, warning of takings liability if State claims newly navigable water
bottoms without compensating landowner).
282. See Crooks, 263 So. 3d at 570–74 (Amy, J., dissenting). Regardless, the
concept of instantaneous prescription differs because it is acquisitive prescription
without the social benefits and codified protections. Acquisitive prescription only
takes land from an inattentive landowner and gives the land to someone who
values it more after a long period of possession; however, instantaneous
prescription takes land even from an attentive landowner still in possession of the
land. See Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 570–72 (La. 2015) (Weimer,
J., concurring). Further, acquisitive prescription has protections such as requiring
30 years of possession; contrarily, instantly transferring ownership of submerged
lands does not require possession or a delay period. See generally LA. CIV. CODE
art. 3486 (2018). Instead, instantaneous prescription creates rights in property that
were not previously present. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co., 646 So. 2d at
412 (citing Yiannopoulos, warning of takings liability).
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property without compensation or prior notice of existing property
rights.283 Instead, the State’s sudden taking of this private property and
subsequent reclassification into public property is the exact type of
injustice takings law prevents.284
On its face, it seems like instantly reverting private property to public
property without compensation is patently inequitable and constitutes a
direct expropriation of property because the government takes the title to
private property and asserts dominion over it without the implied
reversion.285 In Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, a Florida
statute required the clerk of court to take interest from a deposited
interpleader fund as a charge for the service of the court.286 The statute
required the parties to deposit the money into the account.287 The
government argued that the funds became public funds when the parties
deposited them because the state was holding the funds in its public
capacity.288 The United States Supreme Court found that the deposited
funds were private property under Florida law and were not put in the fund
for the public benefit.289 The Court held that this forced deposit plus taking
of interest equaled a taking of private property, which required
compensation, because the funds are a valid property interest and the State
took the interest without a justifiable reason.290 The Court analogized the
case to United States v. Causby because Florida used the funds similar to
how the government used private airspace above land for constant lowlevel flights.291 The Court stated that the government shall not turn a

283. A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete
Transition from the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151, 177 (2012) (“Fairness has two dimensions: protecting
landowners who are the victims of discrimination and avoiding surprise.”).
284. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)
(stating how the transformation of private property into public property without
compensation “is the very kind of thing that the Taking[s] Clause . . . was meant
to prevent”).
285. See generally id.
286. Id. at 161.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 162.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 163–64. In United States v. Causby, the United States Supreme
Court found the government liable for a taking for constant low-level flights over
private land. See generally United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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private thing into a public thing without compensation because it would
be an unjust and arbitrary abuse of the State’s power.292
Although taking interest from an interpleader fund and taking land are
separate issues, Webb’s is illustrative on the macro level of how converting
a public thing to a private thing produces injustice.293 Similarly, Louisiana
would take control of the land through an operation of law reversion and
try to call it public property.294 The government, however, sold the land to
a private party at some point, which gave the private owner a clear property
interest recognized under Louisiana law.295 The State did not sell the land
with any conditions or an implied reversion stating that the land reverts if
a new navigable body of water appears on the land.296 Article 450 would
then turn private property into public property without compensation.297
As one should only use paragraph 2 of article 450 to protect access to
historically navigable water bodies, the use of article 450 to expand State
property would be an arbitrary exercise of State power like in Webb’s.
Placing an arbitrary implied reversion on private property would likely be
a taking under the United States Constitution because private property
cannot become public absent a valid reason;298 thus, reasoning
symmetrically, it should be considered a taking under the Louisiana
Constitution.299
Allowing the State to redefine property rights through the concept of
navigability is incongruent with the equitable concept of takings law.300
Although the landowner whose land abuts historically navigable water
bodies or the territorial sea loses land without compensation because of an
implied reversion, no such implied reversion exists between the State and
the landowner whose land abuts a newly navigable water body.301 Thus,
the latter landowner maintains a valid property right to proceed in an

292. Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164 (“[A] State . . . may not transform private
property into public property without compensation.”) (The Takings Clause
“shields against the arbitrary use of governmental power.”).
293. See id. Analogizing the situation to Webb’s is not a stretch because of the
United States Supreme Court’s analogy to United States v. Causby. Id. at 163–64.
294. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2018).
295. See generally State v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So. 2d 598 (La. 1992).
296. See Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936).
297. See Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164.
298. Id. at 164.
299. See Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1113–14 (La. 2004) (Weimer, J.,
concurring).
300. See generally Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936).
301. See discussion supra Part III.
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inverse condemnation suit if the State takes any of the landowner’s bundle
of ownership rights—usus, fructus, or abusus.302
IV. THE FAIR SOLUTION OR AN EXPANSION TO INACTION TAKINGS
Louisiana landowners whose lands abut newly navigable water bodies
should have their property rights protected, but landowners whose lands
abut historically navigable water bodies are not as fortunate.303 The latter
lose their property without compensation.304 Although not a taking, the
loss without compensation violates the spirit of takings law.305 A remedy
to the situation may present itself through a gratuitous compensation
similar to the levee servitude or by expanding takings law to include
inaction because fewer landowners would “bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”306 After
consideration of both options, expanding takings to inaction is the better
solution because it does not require any constitutional amendments or
legislative solutions. Instead, it adheres to the spirit of the current
Louisiana Constitution.
A. The Gratuitous Amendment
In Louisiana law, a gratuitous compensation affords a landowner
compensation for land lost to the State even though no takings took
place.307 The Louisiana Constitution and Civil Code expressly provide for
a situation in which a gratuitous compensation is appropriate: the levee
servitude.308 Although the State does not owe compensation for
appropriating land for the levee servitude, Louisiana citizens approved a
constitutional provision that provides a gratuitous compensation to the
landowner who loses land when the State exercises the levee servitude.309
The similarities between the levee servitude and land loss due to coastal
change are apparent. First, the levee servitude and implied reversion both

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 604

See discussion supra Section III.B.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part III.
See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Id.
See S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 (La. 2017).
Id.; see LA. CIV. CODE art. 665 (2018).
See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 42; Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298.
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serve public purposes.310 The levee servitude appropriation protects land
from flooding,311 and the implied reversion promotes continuing public
access for commerce and recreation.312 Second, the State placed both
burdens on lands without the landowner’s expressed consent.313 Following
the spirit of the Louisiana Constitution, a constitutional amendment could
be proposed—like the payment for the levee servitude—that provides a
gratuitous payment to landowners whose lands naturally submerge
beneath historically navigable water bodies or the territorial sea.314
The gratuitous payment would help alleviate some of the burden that
the private landowner should not shoulder alone when private land
naturally submerges beneath historically navigable water bodies and the
territorial sea.315 The gratuitous compensation, however, would require
legislative action, which can be a very slow process. In addition, coastal
land loss is not strictly caused by natural factors, such as erosion,

310. Compare Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 (describing need to protect public from
flooding), with Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936) (providing reason
for protecting public access to navigable water bodies).
311. See Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298.
312. See generally Miami Corp., 173 So. 315.
313. Id.; see generally Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298.
314. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 42(A):
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of this constitution, lands and
improvements thereon hereafter actually used or destroyed for levees or
levee drainage purposes shall be paid for as provided by law. With
respect to lands and improvements actually used or destroyed in the
construction, enlargement, improvement, or modification of federal or
non-federal hurricane protection projects, including mitigation related
thereto, such payment shall not exceed the amount of compensation
authorized under Article I, Section 4(G) of this constitution. However,
nothing contained in this Paragraph with respect to compensation for
lands and improvements shall apply to batture or to property the control
of which is vested in the state or any political subdivision for the purpose
of commerce. If the district has no other funds or resources from which
the payment can be made, it shall levy on all taxable property within the
district a tax sufficient to pay for property used or destroyed to be used
solely in the district where collected.
See LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(G) (limiting compensation to Fifth Amendment
requirement instead of full extent of loss). The Fifth Amendment does not require
compensation for the levee servitude, but the Louisiana Supreme Court decided
that the legislature intended to reduce compensation from full extent of the loss to
just compensation. See generally Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298.
315. See generally Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 (describing the reason for paying
the levee servitude).
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subsidence, and a rising sea level.316 In practice, State, private, and natural
factors work in tandem to destroy the coast.317 Thus, the better solution
would be to adopt inaction takings because this approach would help
bridge the gap between natural submersion and State-caused submersion
to promote “fairness and justice” and ensure that the State fulfills its duty
to protect the coast.318
B. Expansion to Inaction
A taking through inaction is the “failure to act, in the face of an
affirmative duty to act.”319 Many states recognize the concept of inaction
leading to takings.320 In Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment,
the Maryland Court of Appeals held the government responsible for a
sewage overflow that the government knew about but did not act to stop.321
Also, as considered in Arreola v. County of Monterey, in California, the
government failed to maintain the levees, which resulted in the flooding
of private property.322 The California Court of Appeals supported an
inverse condemnation claim when “the entity was aware of the risk posed
by its public improvement and deliberately chose a course of action—or
inaction—in the face of that known risk.”323 Additionally, a Florida court
allowed an inverse condemnation claim to proceed when the government
failed to maintain a road, which caused the road to deteriorate to the point
that a property owner could no longer access the private property.324
Currently, a blanket exclusion precludes inaction claims in federal
courts.325 In St. Bernard Parish v. United States, the United States Court
of Federal Claims found that the United States Army Corps failed to
maintain a navigational canal that foreseeably caused flooding to private
property.326 The Court of Federal Claims held the government responsible

316. See Reckdahl, supra note 1.
317. See id.
318. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
319. Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t, 131 A.3d 923, 931 (Md. 2016).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 931.
322. Arreola v. County of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
323. Id. at 55.
324. Jordan v. St. Johns County, 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
325. See St. Bernard Par. v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“We conclude that the government cannot be liable on a takings theory for
inaction . . . .”).
326. Id. at 1358.
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for its inaction in the face of Hurricane Katrina.327 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned the decision and created a
blanket exclusion to inaction liability.328 The Federal Circuit determined
that the government should only be liable for its actions.329 Nevertheless,
the Federal Circuit’s decision is only persuasive authority in Louisiana.330
Louisiana courts have not accepted or rejected the concept of inaction
takings. Thus, Louisiana courts should ignore the Federal Circuit’s
decision and follow the states that have adopted inaction takings because
inaction takings better address the issues of a changing coast.331
Several reasons exist for Louisiana to adopt inaction takings because
of coastal change. First, Louisiana has an affirmative duty to protect its
coast.332 The Louisiana Constitution states: “The natural resources of the
state . . . shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible
and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people.”333
Because the State cannot be held responsible for every natural disaster, it
should be held responsible in situations where it has failed to maintain
public projects that cause coastal loss and where the State chooses inaction
in the face of a foreseeable risk.334
Second, inaction takings would prevent the State’s bad faith.335
Inaction takings guard against the possibility of the State picking and
choosing places to protect and allowing more profitable lands to submerge
beneath navigable water bodies and the territorial sea.336 It has become a
common practice of the State to take land from private citizens before oil
leases start operating because if the oil leases commence operations, then
the landowner maintains the mineral rights, even though the landowner
loses surface rights.337 Inaction would guard against the perverse incentive
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1357.
329. Id.
330. Parish Nat’l Bank v. Lane, 397 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (La. 1981) (stating
“federal courts’ interpretations . . . would be . . . persuasive, though not
controlling”).
331. Maryland serves as a good example: “failure to act, in the face of an
affirmative duty to act.” Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t, 131 A.3d 923, 931
(Md. 2016).
332. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
333. Id.
334. See Arreola v. County of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
335. See Reckdahl, supra note 1.
336. See id.
337. See generally id.; see also LA. REV STAT. § 9:1151 (2018) (the Freeze
Statute):
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to allow certain lands to flood so the landowner loses the surface and
mineral rights.338
Third, the Louisiana Constitution supports a broader reading than the
federal Takings Clause.339 The Louisiana Constitution provides that
“property shall not be taken or damaged.”340 The Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause contains no such reference to the term “damaged.”341 The
addition of the word “damaged” in the Louisiana Constitution provides
evidence that takings liability in Louisiana reaches further than the federal
Takings Clause because the Louisiana Legislature could not have intended
to include “damaged” as superfluous language.342 Further, the addition of
the word “damaged” ensures that “the right to compensation is broad” in
Louisiana.343 Thus, the current Louisiana Constitution supports a broad
application of takings liability to include inaction.344
Lastly, inaction takings can bridge the gap between State-caused
submersion and natural submersion.345 The landowner whose land abuts
In all cases where a change occurs in the ownership of land or water
bottoms as a result of the action of a navigable stream, bay, lake, sea, or
arm of the sea, in the change of its course, bed, or bottom, or as a result
of accretion, dereliction, erosion, subsidence, or other condition resulting
from the action of a navigable stream, bay, lake, sea, or arm of the sea,
the new owner of such lands or water bottoms, including the state of
Louisiana, shall take the same subject to and encumbered with any oil,
gas, or mineral lease covering and affecting such lands or water bottoms,
and subject to the mineral and royalty rights of the lessors in such lease,
their heirs, successors, and assigns; the right of the lessee or owners of
such lease and the right of the mineral and royalty owners thereunder
shall be in no manner abrogated or affected by such change in ownership.
338. See LA. REV STAT. § 9:1151; see also Reckdahl, supra note 1 (taking the
landowners’ land right before it produced oil).
339. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B).
340. Id. (emphasis added).
341. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”)
342. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a ‘cardinal principle
of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be construed
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void,
or insignificant.’”) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001)).
343. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1113 (La. 2004) (Weimer, J.,
concurring). Federal takings encompass all of Louisiana takings and go beyond
to cover some of what Louisiana calls damages. Id. at 1113–14 (Weimer, J.,
concurring). Louisiana damages go beyond some of the scope of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 1113–14 (Weimer, J., concurring).
344. Id. at 1113–14 (Weimer, J., concurring).
345. See discussion supra Part IV.
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historically natural navigable water bodies and the territorial sea has an
implied reversion read into the title, through which the landowner loses
submerged land without compensation when natural forces cause the
submersion.346 When a State project causes land to submerge under water,
Louisiana courts are more likely to find a temporary flooding and
compensate the landowner for the action of the State.347 Inaction takings
would compensate the landowner whose land primarily submerged due to
natural causes when the State had the ability to prevent and chose not to
act or did not maintain current protection structures.348 Inaction takings
would suspend the implied reversion of the land abutting historically
navigable water bodies or the territorial sea until the State compensated
the landowner because the State contributed to the submersion through
inaction.349 In other words, the submersion is no longer completely natural,
so the State breached the aleatory contract and now has an implied contract
to compensate the landowner when the State takes title to the submerged
land.350
CONCLUSION
The Thibodeauxs chose to negotiate instead of going to court to fight
the State over the submerged land.351 Uncertainty around the law because
of coastal change may have contributed to their decision.352 Clearing up
the uncertainty will save similarly situated families from potentially
making a mistake, whether that is negotiating when needing to sue or suing
when needing to negotiate. As the law currently stands, landowners whose
lands abut historically navigable water bodies or the territorial sea lose
land that naturally submerges.353 The bottoms of newly navigable water
bodies, including non-navigable ones that could be reclassified as
346. See generally Miami Corp. v. State, 173 So. 315 (La. 1936).
347. Crooks v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 263 So. 3d 540 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2019-0160, 2020 WL 499233 (La. Jan. 29, 2020)
(reversing the lower court on the issue of prescription) (finding temporary
flooding after flood project kept private land flooded so long that people thought
it was a lake).
348. See Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t, 131 A.3d 923, 931 (Md. 2016).
349. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 459 (1903) (citing United States v.
Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884)).
350. Id. (reading in an implied contract to compensate when the government
takes the land).
351. See Reckdahl, supra note 1.
352. See generally id.
353. See discussion supra Part II.
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navigable, should stay as private property until the State formally
expropriates the land because the landowner should maintain the valid
property right.354 To remedy the harsh situation of the landowner whose
land abuts historically navigable water bodies or the territorial sea,
Louisiana could adopt a gratuitous compensation for landowners subject
to the implied reversion.355 Alternatively, expanding takings jurisprudence
would compensate the landowner who deserves compensation because of
the State allowing certain lands to submerge.356 Expanding takings
jurisprudence is the best option because it incorporates the spirit of the
current Louisiana Constitution and bridges the gap between natural
submersion and State-caused submersion.

354. See discussion supra Part III.
355. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); S. Lafourche
Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 (La. 2017).
356. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
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